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Most children in poor families appear to be doing substantially better by the late 1990's.
The effect of welfare reform on these changes
The strong economy of the 1990's provides one obvious explanation for the increases in children's family income described above. In times of economic growth, earnings opportunities tend to increase for families throughout the income distribution. But what role did the policy changes associated with welfare reform play in the positive shift in children's family income? The authors were particularly interested in whether lowincome children in states that enacted strong work incentives for welfare recipients experienced larger or smaller income changes.
Blank and Schoeni find that states that adopted strong work incentives in the mid-1990's as part of their welfare-reform package appear to have produced greater increases in the income of children living in families without two parents present. This finding did not appear to be related to the overall economic health of individual states, as measured by unemployment rates.
The authors go on to compare the effects of two different types of welfare reform policies:
(1) positive "cash incentives" to work, primarily earnings disregards, or the extent to which welfare benefits are reduced as earnings increase, and (2) negative "penalty incentives," or sanctions and time limits.
Cash incentives
The analysis finds that states that implemented high cash incentives to work showed greater increases in income among the entire range of poor and near-poor children's families, compared to families in states with weaker cash incentives to work. This is consistent with other work, such as the results reported by MDRC from Minnesota's Family Investment Program (MFIP) that suggest high earnings disregards can help reduce poverty and increase incomes. 
Penalty incentives
The authors report that poor children's families who lived in states that implemented stricter sanction and time limit policies showed slightly higher income gains than families in states with more lenient penalties for not working. In contrast with the widespread effects of high cash incentives, however, most of the effects from strong penalties came from greater gains within a specific narrow income range among very poor families.
Policy implications
The findings of the analysis suggest that the welfare reform efforts of certain sets of states -especially those with higher earnings disregards, which provided positive economic incentives for women going to work -produced greater income gains among lowincome families with children.
The authors note that the success of penalty incentives is perhaps surprising, since, contrary to many predictions, it was in the more lenient states with softer penalties where children's income seems to have grown the least.
However, the authors issued strong cautions about drawing specific policy conclusions based on the results. Their caveats include the following: First, the study provided a descriptive, not causal, analysis. The authors were unable to make any sophisticated effort to control for changes in the economy or in the state political environment that might be different in states with different policy changes. Hence, enforcing stricter sanctions on existing families on welfare may result in very different income effects than occurred for families at an earlier stage.
Data
The authors use data on children's household income from the March Current Population Survey (CPS), averaging together information from 1992 -1995 and information from 1997 -2000. The analysis accounts for differences in family size by using the income-to-needs ratio rather than actual income levels. The income-toneeds ratio is defined as the cash income level of the child's family divided by the official poverty line for that family.
The authors' characterization of state policy post-1996 as "strong," "mixed," or 
